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Abstract. Public key cryptosystems play a crucial role in the security
of widely used communication protocols and in the protection of data.
However, the foreseen emergence of quantum computers will break the
security of most of the asymmetric cryptographic techniques used today,
including those used to verify the authenticity of electronic travel docu-
ments. The security of international borders would thus be jeopardised
in a quantum scenario. To overcome the threat to current asymmet-
ric cryptography, post-quantum cryptography aims to provide practical
mechanisms which are resilient to attacks using quantum computers. In
this paper, we investigate the practicality of employing post-quantum
digital signatures to ensure the authenticity of an electronic travel doc-
ument. We created a special-purpose public key infrastructure based on
these techniques, and give performance results for both creation and ver-
ification of certificates. This is the first important step towards specifying
the next generation of electronic travel documents, as well as providing
a valuable test use case for post-quantum techniques.
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1 Introduction
Like many modern systems, the security of electronic passports and other elec-
tronic travel documents relies on public key cryptography. The idea of making
travel documents electronic, i.e. by adding a chip, emerged in 1988 [14], although
it wasn’t until the late 1990s that electronic travel documents started to appear.
A few years later, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) released
design specifications to enable their authenticity to be verified worldwide [23],
and shortly after, in 2004, the first ICAO compliant electronic travel document
was issued [4]. Initiatives such as the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) [45]
helped their adoption by forcing member states to implement these specifica-
tions for their citizens’ travel documents.
Starting with the work of Juels et al. [31], since 2005 a range of security
analyses of the ICAO standards have been performed [21,39]. The feature in the
ICAO specifications which has gone through the most changes because of security
issues covers access control to the chip see Avoine et al. [4] and Chaabouni
and Vaudenay [10]. Versions of the ICAO access control protocol include the
2005 Basic Access Control (BAC) and the 2009 Extended Access Control (EAC)
versions 1 and 2 [4].
Quite separately from the known issues with the ICAO protocols, the po-
tential advent of large-scale, general-purpose, quantum computing will radically
change the situation. Quantum computers can solve mathematical problems that
classical computers cannot. Over the past few years, much effort has been de-
voted to building such a device, although experts in the field suggest that it will
be one or two decades before large scale quantum computers are a reality [12].
In the post-quantum era, the currently used asymmetric cryptographic tech-
niques, i.e. integer factorization-based schemes (such as RSA [42]) and discrete
logarithm-based schemes [15]), will become breakable [40,43]. This threatens the
security of a wide range of systems, including the authenticity of electronic travel
documents (the main focus of this paper).
In order to address this issue, as summarised by Bernstein and Lange [7],
much recent effort has been devoted to developing post-quantum cryptographic
schemes, i.e. schemes secure against attack using both quantum and classical
computers. In parallel with this research effort, a number of major standardis-
ation bodies have inaugurated projects to develop standards for post-quantum
algorithms. Perhaps the most important of these is the standardisation process
led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST ) [12]. So far,
from an initial 82 submissions, after Round 3 of this process only 151 schemes
remain in the running for adoption2.
Besides having a portfolio of cryptographic algorithms resilient to crypt-
analysis using quantum computers, it is also necessary to ensure that they are
practical and can interoperate with current applications and protocols based
on asymmetric cryptography. For example, Kampanakis et al. [32] showed that
post-quantum X.509 certificates are viable for TLS-like communication proto-
cols for use in a “post-quantum Internet”. X.509 certificates are also commonly
used to protect the authenticity and integrity of data inside electronic travel
documents, namely the owner’s data.
The focus of this paper is on a practical trial designed to test the feasibility
of using currently available post-quantum cryptographic techniques in electronic
travel documents. We have implemented a post-quantum Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI ) for electronic travel documents, and have also obtained results on
its performance. Since this PKI is fundamental to the operation of security for
electronic travel documents, the work described here can be seen as both pre-
liminary research for the next generation of travel documents and also a testbed
for evaluating post-quantum cryptographic techniques.
1 More precisely, 7 schemes are finalists and the other 8 are kept as alternatives.
2 The results of Round 3 of the process were published on July 22, 2020, https://csrc.
nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-3-submissions
In Section 2 we describe how security is implemented for electronic travel
documents. We then explain the development of the prototype post-quantum
PKI in Section 3 and present the challenges we encountered in Section 4. Finally,
we discuss our results in Section 5 and draw conclusions in Section 6.
2 Security for electronic travel documents
2.1 Electronic travel documents
For the last couple of decades, digital signatures have been used to protect
electronic travel and national identity documents. The ICAO started work on
Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) as long ago as the late 1960s
[23]. More recently, in 1998, work commenced on electronic MRTDs (e-MRTDs),
resulting in a set of specifications covering the issue and border verification of
such documents [23].
The specifications include protocols and mechanisms designed to protect the
data inside the contactless chips embedded in the documents and allow border
controllers to securely authenticate an issued e-MRTD. In order to verify an e-
MRTD, the inspection system (IS ) used by border controllers for validating the
authenticity of an e-MRTD, must:
1. access the contactless chip (see §2.4), where the IS proves to the chip that it
is authorised to access it;
2. authenticate the card data (see §2.5), where the IS verifies that the data
inside the chip (including the information in the data page3) is digitally
signed by an appropriate authority;
3. (optionally) authenticate the contactless chip (see §2.6), where the chip
proves to the IS that it is a genuine chip belonging to a genuine e-MRTD;
4. (optionally) perform extended security protocols, e.g. to gain access to spe-
cific biometric data such as fingerprint or iris information.
2.2 Public Key Infrastructures
The security of e-MRTDs rests on an underlying PKI, the operation of which is
the main focus of this paper. For our purposes a PKI (see, for example, Barak
[5]) is a means of distributing trusted copies of public keys for asymmetric cryp-
tographic techniques, and relies on the use of digital signatures. It involves a
collection of public key certificates, digitally signed by Certification Authorities
(CAs), where each certificate contains a public key and associated information
including the name of the owner, who is usually assumed to have the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Certificates which are
no longer trusted are called revoked certificates, and are listed in a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) digitally signed by a CA.
3 The document data page is the page containing personal information of the document
owner, such as photograph, name, date of birth, etc.
The entities participating in a PKI can be arranged as the vertices in a
directed graph, where an edge goes from A to B if the certificate for B (CertB)
was signed using A’s private signature key, i.e. so that the public key of A can
be used to verify CertB . Typically, a PKI will be arranged hierarchically, so that
there is always a direct path (a certificate chain) from the Root CA to every
end-entity.
That is, if an entity has a trusted copy of the Root CA public key (typically
distributed as a self-signed Root CA certificate), then a trusted copy of every
end-entity’s public key can be obtained in the following way. First construct a
certificate chain from the Root CA to the end-entity, and then verify all the
certificates in the chain in turn, at each stage verifying a certificate using the
public key obtained by verifying the previous certificate and the status of the
certificate using the corresponding CRL.
2.3 PKI for electronic travel documents
The PKI for e-MRTDs, including e-passports, typically has three levels. The
Root CAs are known as Country Signing Certification Authorities (CSCAs),
and, as the name suggests, are typically operated on behalf of a government
department such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each country will operate
a Root CSCA, and each such Root CSCA will have a digital signature key pair
and a (self-signed) certificate for its public key, i.e. a public key certificate signed
using the corresponding private key. A Root CSCA uses its private signing key
to sign Document Signer (DS) Certificates (DSCs), containing public keys of
e-MRTD manufacturers. The corresponding private signature keys are used by
the manufacturers to sign information held inside an e-MRTD.
In order to prove the authenticity and integrity of an e-MRTD at a border
control, the self-signed root CSCA certificates are shared among states by bi-
lateral exchanges, through states’ Master Lists4 or soon using the ICAO Public
Key Directory5.
In a typical PKI the Root CA is kept offline in order to diminish the risks of
a potential security breach that might lead to the leakage of its private signing
key, whereas the Intermediate CAs are kept online. The reason is operational,
as requests are sent on a daily basis to the CAs for issuing and revoking end-
entity certificates. If and when an Intermediate CA certificate needs to be re-
voked/renewed because of a potential compromise or expiry of its private signing
key, the Root CA is activated and its private signing key is used locally to is-
sue a new Intermediate CA certificate or revoke the current one. In a PKI for
e-MRTDs, the Root CSCA is also kept offline, in line with a recommendation
by ICAO [26]. There are no Intermediate CSCAs because, from an operational
point of view, this role is managed by the DSs, who receive all requests for
signing e-MRTD data sets.
4 For example the German Master List: https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/BSI/ElekAusweise/CSCA/GermanMasterList.html.
5 See https://pkddownloadsg.icao.int/.
2.4 Access to the contactless chip
The first step for an IS is to gain authorised access to the e-MRTD’s chip.
It proves to the chip that it has the necessary authorisation using one of the
following two ICAO-specified protocols6 [26]. To perform them, the IS shall have
access to the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ ) of the e-MRTD and be equipped
to acquire it from the data page, requiring the passport to be physically opened
to be read optically.
We only very briefly sketch the two protocols here, since they are not the
main focus of this paper. As noted above in Section 1, the shortcomings of the
first scheme have been widely discussed.
Basic Access Control Basic Access Control (BAC) is based on symmetric
cryptography, and consists of a three-pass challenge-response protocol in accor-
dance with Key Establishment Mechanism 6 of ISO/IEC 11770-2 [30] using two-
key Triple-DES (see ISO/IEC 18033-3 [28]). A Message Authentication Code
(MAC) is appended to the ciphertexts, computed using MAC algorithm 6 of
ISO/IEC 9797-1 [29].
Password Authenticated Connexion Establishment Password Authenti-
cated Connexion Establishment (PACE)[27] is based on asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, and consists of a password-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol (see [9]) which supplements and enhances BAC. The chip verifies that
the IS is authorised to access its data and a secure communications channel is
established.
2.5 Authentication of the data
This step, i.e. authentication of the chip-resident data, forms the main focus
of this paper; verifying the validity of the e-MRTD data is probably the most
important security function. This step includes a single protocol called Passive
Authentication (PA) [25], so called because it does not require any computational
capabilities (such as performing cryptographic operations) from the chip.
However, the storage capacity of the chip is of paramount importance for
executing PA, since the chip needs to keep certain key data. In particular, all
the data related to the owner, such as the data page information, owner’s photo
and fingerprints, etc., are stored in Data Groups (DGs) on the chip [24]. Also
stored is the Document Security Object (SOD), which contains the hash values
of the DGs and is digitally signed with the private key of a manufacturer. The
corresponding manufacturer public key is in a DSC signed with the private key
associated with a root CSCA certificate (belonging to the government agency on
whose behalf the manufacturer is acting). The DSC must be placed in the SOD
6 Since January 2018, states have been permitted to implement PACE but not BAC,
given the known security issues with BAC; previously both protocols had to be
implemented for interoperability reasons.
so that the IS can retrieve it and use it to help verify this digital signature in
order to verify the integrity and authenticity of the chip data [25].
In this paper, a key focus is the size of these data elements (see Section 5).
Post-Quantum Digital Signature Algorithms (PQDSAs) usually involve longer
keys and signatures than currently used techniques [7], and thus we need to
investigate the limited storage capacity of current chips to discover if they are
adequate for the post-quantum era.
The PKI described in §2.3 is used in the following way to support data
authentication. The IS retrieves the signed data and the DSC from the chip.
The IS determines which CSCA signed the DSC, and constructs a certificate
chain from the appropriate Root CSCA certificate and the DSC. Verifying this
chain (using the appropriate stored trusted Root CSCA public key) enables the
appropriate DSC public key to be authenticated. Finally, this public key can be
used to verify the signature on the chip data.
2.6 Authentication of the contactless chip
The third step for the IS is to authenticate the contactless chip, although this is
not mandatory. This step enables the IS to verify that the chip is genuine, pre-
venting copying and/or substitution; it uses one of the following three protocols.
As in §2.4, the protocols for this step are only briefly sketched, since they are
not the main focus of this paper.
Active Authentication Active Authentication [25] is based on asymmetric
cryptography and requires the chip to sign a challenge sent by the IS with a pri-
vate key held by the chip. This means that the chip must have the computational
power to perform a digital signature. The associated public key is accessible by
the IS, and its authenticity has already been verified during PA (see §2.5). After
verifying the signed challenge, the IS is assured of the authenticity of the chip.
This technique can raise a privacy issue under specific conditions [31], as each
generated signature could be logged. The owner of an e-MRTD (and thus the
owner of the private key used to sign the challenges) could then be traced using
the logged signatures. The Chip Authentication protocol (see below) has been
devised as a replacement in order to mitigate this risk.
Chip Authentication Chip Authentication [25] is based on asymmetric cryp-
tography, more precisely on a variant of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement proto-
col [15]. In addition to guaranteeing the authenticity of the chip, it also provides
authentication of the data inside the chip and a secure communication channel
between chip and IS. Moreover, as the exchanged keys are ephemeral, it prevents
any tracing of the e-MRTD’s owner [25]. The static key pair used in the protocol
is stored inside the chip; the private key is held in secure memory whereas the
public key is accessible to the IS. However, Chip Authentication is subject to
reset and transferability attacks [8].
PACE with Chip Authentication Mapping PACE with Chip Authentica-
tion Mapping is a combination of PACE (§2.4) and Chip Authentication (§2.6),
optimised for performance.
3 Building a post-quantum PKI for electronic travel
documents
As discussed in §2.5, the authenticity of e-MRTD chip data is verified using the
PA protocol. This protocol relies on the PKI established by states through their
networks of CSCAs. Thus, to ensure that PA continues to provide security in
the post-quantum world, a post-quantum PKI (pqPKI ), i.e. a PKI based on the
architecture presented in §2.3 but using post-quantum cryptography, is needed.
To verify the practicality of building and operating such a PKI, we have built a
proof-of-concept implementation which we next describe.
3.1 Design
For the purposes of this proof-of-concept, the PKI architecture for e-MRTDs
as described in §2.3 can be simplified without loss of generality. The proof-of-
concept PKI is composed of one CSCA certificate and one DSC.
Both types of certificate follow the standard structure for an X.509 certifi-
cate, signed using a PQDSA, e.g. as presented in [32], although the certificates
must also be compliant with the relevant ICAO specification [26]. This latter
specification defines the extensions and the associated values for each type of
certificate in the e-MRTD PKI, with the details depending on their role in this
structure, i.e. their certificate profile.
The CSCA certificate is self-signed and the associated private key is used to
sign the private key associated with the DSC. The DSC is then normally used
to sign an e-MRTD document; in our case this involves signing data of any type,
ideally an SOD (see Section 2).
3.2 Algorithm selection
Quantum computers pose a great threat to public key cryptography, includ-
ing digital signature algorithms. Signature schemes usually use a hash function,
which must remain secure in a post-quantum scenario [7]. We used the hash
function that the designers included in their implementation, typically SHA-3
[46].
To enable a comparison, we incorporated seven different PQDSAs into our
prototype, all of which were candidates in Round 27 of the NIST standardisation
process [12]. We chose these particular algorithms from the set of candidates
for two main reasons: the cryptographic library we used (see §3.3) provides
7 The experiments were run before the publication of the Round 3 which was an-
nounced on July 22, 2020.
implementations of these schemes, and as their security is not based on the
same mathematical properties, they cover a broad range of the hard problems
underlying post-quantum cryptography. The chosen algorithms8 are as follows:
– qTESLA [3], which is a lattice-based digital signature scheme. The hardness
assumption on which the security of qTESLA is based is the R-LWE problem
[35,41].
– CRYSTALS-Dilithium [17], referred simply as Dilithium here, which is also
a lattice-based digital signature scheme. The hardness assumption on which
the security of Dilithium is based is the M-LWE problem [2,41].
– Picnic [11], whose security is not directly based on hardness assumptions,
as is usually the case in public key cryptography. Its security is rather based
on a zero-knowledge proof [20] and symmetric key primitives, which makes
the scheme very different from the other examples.
– FALCON [18] is also a lattice-based digital signature scheme, based on the
work of Gentry et al. [19]. Its hardness assumption is based on the Short-
Integer-Solution (SIS) [1] problem over NTRU lattices [22].
– MQDSS [13] is based on the hardness of the multivariate quadratic problem.
– Rainbow [16] is also based on the hardness of the multivariate quadratic
problem.
– SPHINCS+ [6] is a set of three stateless hash-based signature schemes. The
three schemes differ by the hash function used. We decided to use only two
of the schemes, one instantiated with SHAKE256 (which is part of the SHA-3
family [46]) and the other with Haraka [34].
3.3 Implementation
To implement the prototype, we used a fork of OpenSSL combined with the
library liboqs from the Open Quantum Safe (OQS ) project [44]. OpenSSL is an
open-source implementation of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols, and incorporates a widely used cryptographic
primitives library. It was not designed to establish PKIs, such as a PKI for e-
MRTDs; however, despite this we decided to use this software because of its wide
use and flexibility.
liboqs is an open-source library in C of post-quantum algorithms, which has
been integrated into prototype forks of OpenSSL and OpenSSH. liboqs includes
algorithms from the NIST Post Quantum Standardization Project. To generate
the PKI for e-MRTDs described in §3.1, we implemented an OpenSSL configura-
tion file that caused it to issue certificates with the appropriate extensions. The
configuration file included all the certificate components and extensions needed
by each certificate type, as defined in the relevant certificate profile, i.e. a CSCA
certificate or a DSC, as specified in ICAO Doc 9303 Part 12 [26].
8 Some of the chosen algorithms did not advance to Round 3 of the NIST competition.
The results are published on the following website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
post-quantum-cryptography/round-3-submissions.
3.4 Overview of experiments performed
For each of the selected PQDSAs (together with two currently used schemes for
comparison purposes), we performed the following steps.
1. We generated a key pair to be associated with the root CSCA certificate,
with the parameter sets corresponding to the highest NIST security level
available [38].
2. We generated a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) with the previously gen-
erated key pair and the CSCA certificate profile in order to create a (self-
signed) CSCA certificate.
3. We generated a key pair to be associated with the DSC, with the parameter
sets corresponding to the lowest NIST security level available [38].
4. We generated another CSR with the key pair generated in step (2) and the
DS certificate profile to create a DSC signed using the CSCA private key
generated in step (1).
5. We hashed and signed a random data string using the private key associated
with the DSC to complete the chain.
The two key pairs generated in step (1) and (3) do not have the same param-
eter sets because their role is quite different (see [26] for more details). The key
pair from step (1) has a long lifespan (it can be as much as one to two decades)
and is used from time to time to verify or renew DSCs; thus a high NIST security
level is required. The key pair from step (3) however has a much shorter lifespan
(it can be days, weeks or months depending on the configuration chosen by the
relevant state) and is used to sign the chip data of many e-MRTDs (during their
production) in order to ensure their authenticity. To optimize performance, a
lower NIST security level seems adequate.
4 Challenges
OpenSSL is an implementation of SSL/TLS, and is not designed to generate
and manage a PKI producing certificates for signing e-MRTDs according to the
relevant ICAO specifications [25,26]. For example, extensions such as Private
Key Usage period, which are required by ICAO, cannot be set up with OpenSSL,
although they can be displayed. To overcome this difficulty, we took advantage
of the fact that OpenSSL allows integration of ad hoc extensions created by the
user via the Arbitrary Extension module9. This allows an implementer to encode
arbitrary extensions in created certificates10.
A problem was encountered when trying to create a certificate chain. Al-
though the software produced chains using well-established digital signature
schemes, it refused to produce them for the chosen post-quantum algorithms. We
reported the problem to the authors of the liboqs library, and simultaneously
9 https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man5/x509v3 config.html
10 An example of such an ad hoc extension is given at: http://openssl.6102.n7.nabble.
com/Private-Key-Usage-Period-td28401.html
worked on a resolution. The issue has been resolved and the documentation for
the software has been updated11.
5 Results
We generated certificates according to the two certificate profiles described in
Section 3 (CSCA certificate and DSC) for ten algorithms and two parameter
sets, and in each case measured the memory needed to store them and their
generation time. To perform the operations we used an Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS
x86 64 machine with 8GB of RAM and a four-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470
CPU @ 3.20GHz. Two of the ten algorithms used were long-established signa-
ture schemes (RSASSA-PSS [37] and ECDSA [33] with the Brainpool parameters
[36]), which were included for comparison purposes. We chose these algorithms
because they are currently used by governments in their CSCAs12 (see [4] for
more details). The eight other algorithms were the PQDSAs presented in Sec-
tion 3. Note that in the results reported below, certificate generation included
both key pair generation and signing of the certificate, apart from Figures 1a,
1b and 1c for which the different steps of the certificate issuance process have
been clearly separated. Table 1 summarises the algorithms and key lengths used
for the two certificate types.
Table 1: Algorithms and key lengths by certificate type
CSCA certificate DSC
RSASSA-PSS 4096 bits with SHA-256 2048 bits with SHA-256
Brainpool 384 bits with SHA-256 224 bits with SHA-256
qTESLA qTESLA-p-III with SHAKE256 qTESLA-p-I with SHAKE128
Dilithium Dilithium-4 with SHAKE256 Dilithium-2 with SHAKE128
Picnic Picnic2-L5-FS with SHAKE256 Picnic2-L1-FS with SHAKE128
FALCON FALCON-1024 with SHAKE256 FALCON-1024 with SHAKE256
MQDSS MQDSS-31-64 with SHAKE256 MQDSS-31-48 with SHAKE256
Rainbow Rainbow-Vc with SHA-512 Rainbow-Ia with SHA-256
SPHINCS+ SPHINCS-Haraka-256f-robust SPHI NCS-Haraka-128f-robust
SPHINCS+ SPHINCS-SHAKE256-256f-robust SPHINCS-SHAKE256-128f-robust
To construct a post-quantum PKI, we separated certificate generation into
three steps, according to the process described in §3.1, as follows:
1. generation of the key pair;
2. generation of the CSR; and
11 See resolution in https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssl/issues/68
12 In particular, the CSCA certificate from Luxembourg is signed using RSASSA-PSS.
See https://repository.incert.lu/ for more details.
3. generation of the certificate (including the digital signature of the CSR gen-
erated in step (2) using the key generated in step (1)).
To be consistent with the associated certificate profile, the CSCA certificates
were all self-signed and the DSCs were signed with a CSCA private key from
the same algorithm family, e.g. a DSC including a qTESLA-p-I public key was
signed with a qTESLA-p-III private key. We measured the execution time for
1000 iterations. The results are shown in Figures 1a, 1b and 1c respectively for
each generation step. Figure 1d shows the total execution time for the three
steps.
Overall, Dilithium is the best performing PQDSA, and even has a slightly
better performance then Brainpool. The most secure version of Rainbow gave
the worst performance, since key generation is very slow. Similar remarks apply
to RSASSA-PSS. However, the less secure version of Rainbow performed better for
the DSCs, as SPHINCS-SHAKE was slower. In particular, for SPHINCS-SHAKE and
also Picnic, as expected their key generation is quite fast, although computing
signatures is much slower than for their counterparts. All the other PQDSAs
give results that are of the same order of magnitude, except qTESLA which gave
similar results to Dilithium and Brainpool, but still performs much better than
RSASSA-PSS.
In addition, we generated as many certificates as possible during a five-second
period for each certificate profile, algorithm and key length. The results are
exactly as expected based on Figure 1d. Again, Dilithium shows on average
better performance than all the other schemes, with Brainpool and qTESLA
almost as good. Because of slow key pair generation or signature computation,
we managed to generate on average only a few CSCA certificates and DSCs
with the four worst performing algorithms: Rainbow, Picnic, SPHINCS-SHAKE
and RSASSA-PSS.
With respect to computation, the performance of several post-quantum schemes
was actually superior to that of the existing algorithms. However, we also ex-
amined the memory space necessary to store the various certificates. This is a
crucial point to consider in practice because of the limited memory capacity of
contactless chips.
The certificates based on the two classical algorithms were significantly smaller
than all of those based on post-quantum algorithms (see Figure 3a), although
Rainbow and Dilithium yielded much shorter certificates than their peers. When
considering the sizes of the generated key pairs (see Figure 3b), we obtained het-
erogeneous results. PQDSAs based on symmetric cryptography such as Picnic
and SPHINCS+ have extremely short keys. Brainpool has similar key sizes. As
for Rainbow, both certificate and key sizes are much greater than any of the
other algorithms. Figures 3a and 3b suggest that, as far as storage is concerned,
Falcon is the best post-quantum candidate, with Dilithium not far behind.
Over and above these somewhat abstract performance results, we wanted to
consider how a switch to post-quantum algorithms would affect the “real world”.
That is, we wanted to assess the impact of a move to the post-quantum world on
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000
CSCA
DS
753.3
96.2
4.8
3.8
10.6
4.4
3
3.4
2.4
2.4
57.8
22.9
3.5
2.7
4,476.3
135.2
4
2.8
24.5
9.1
Seconds
T
y
p
e
o
f
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
RSASSA-PSS Brainpool qTESLA Dilithium Picnic
FALCON MQDSS Rainbow SPHINCS-Haraka SPHINCS-SHAKE
(a) Time in seconds to generate 1000 key
pairs
−200 0 200 400 600 800
CSCA
DS
12.6
4.9
5.1
4
7.7
5.1
4.7
4.2
653.2
112.2
16.6
9.9
37.4
15.1
73.4
9
43.1
18.8
452
161.6
Seconds
T
y
p
e
o
f
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
RSASSA-PSS Brainpool qTESLA Dilithium Picnic
FALCON MQDSS Rainbow SPHINCS-Haraka SPHINCS-SHAKE
(b) Time in seconds to generate 1000 CSRs
−200 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200
CSCA
DS
13.7
14
6.9
6.4
9.5
9.5
5.2
5.1
859.1
704.4
17.4
17.1
60.8
45.3
128.8
214.3
44.2
44.8
464.2
459.4
Seconds
T
y
p
e
o
f
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
RSASSA-PSS Brainpool qTESLA Dilithium Picnic
FALCON MQDSS Rainbow SPHINCS-Haraka SPHINCS-SHAKE
(c) Time in seconds to generate 1000 cer-
tificates
−1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
CSCA
DS
779.6
115.1
16.8
14.1
27.8
18.9
13
12.7
1,514.7
46
91.9
50.1
101.8
63.1
4,678.6
358.6
91.3
66.4
940.7
630.1
Seconds
T
y
p
e
o
f
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
RSASSA-PSS Brainpool qTESLA Dilithium Picnic
FALCON MQDSS Rainbow SPHINCS-Haraka SPHINCS-SHAKE
(d) Total time in seconds
Fig. 1: Performance results
CSCA DS
0
500
1,000
1,500
9 48
588
459
395 357
1,169
665
9 7
73 113
136 90
3 24
113 86
11 9
Type of certificate
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
ce
rt
ifi
ca
te
s
RSASSA-PSS Brainpool qTESLA Dilithium Picnic
FALCON MQDSS Rainbow SPHINCS-Haraka SPHINCS-SHAKE
Fig. 2: Throughput of certificates in a five-second period
the generation and management of CSCA certificates and DSCs for government
authorities.
We used as an example Luxembourg, in which the management of the PKI
for generating the digital signatures of e-MRTDs has been assigned to a public
agency13 under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
We did not consider the computational power of the contactless chips inside
the e-MRTDs, but rather the memory space available in those chips (see Sec-
tion 2). As explained above, the computational power of the contactless chips
is not the main focus here. Such issues are the responsibility of the e-MRTD
and chip manufacturers, and a CSCA, as a purchaser, has little say over such
detailed design matters.
Typically, the infrastructure of a PKI is based on servers and hardware secu-
rity modules, and can be arbitrarily expanded. CSCA certificates are re-issued
every 3 to 5 years [26], and thus any cost change for CSCA certificate generation
in terms of performance and memory will not be an issue. Two criteria are used
to determine when DSCs must be renewed: their lifespan and the number of
signatures performed. As best practice, both should be kept low. Typical limits
might be a lifespan of at most one month and a limit of 100 000 e-MRTDs. In the
case of Luxembourg, with only around 600 000 inhabitants of which only half are
citizens, we can assume that the production of e-MRTDs is much less than many
other countries. With this number of citizens, each DSC is most unlikely to reach
13 https://www.incert.lu
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Fig. 3: Memory space results
the threshold of 100 000 digital signatures. For the algorithms we examined, we
have disparate results. For some PQDSAs, both key generation and signing are
faster than for the classical schemes, although this was not universally true.
When considering the memory space capacities of the contactless chip inside
e-MRTDs, we need only to check that the chip provides enough memory space
to store the post-quantum certificates and signatures necessary to perform PA,
a protocol which does not require any computational power from the chip (see
Section 2.5). Current chips14 for e-MRTDs can have as much as 160 Kbytes of
EEPROM memory and 280 Kbytes of User ROM. This would be large enough
to store a post-quantum certificate and digital signatures for all of the PQDSAs
we studied except Rainbow.
If we consider both computational and storage requirements, Dilithium of-
fers the best performance overall. Falcon has very low storage requirements, but
performs worse than Dilithium computationally. In particular, for the CSCA
certificates Dilithium performed 7 times faster than Falcon, and for the DSCs,
4 times (see Figure 1d)15. Also, Dilithium offers computational performance
comparable to the elliptic curve scheme.
6 Conclusions and future work
As in the work of Kampanakis et al. [32], the results of this paper show that
post-quantum X.509 certificates can be used in current applications such as e-
MRTDs. We used the seven different post-quantum digital signature algorithms
as examples in our proof-of-concept, and showed that the performance for key
generation and digital signature is clearly good enough (for most of the PQDSAs)
to replace classical cryptographic asymmetric techniques (namely RSASSA-PSS
and Brainpool), a result that is particularly clear in the case of Dilithium.
At the same time, whilst memory requirements increase, the change is not suffi-
ciently large to make the algorithms impractical. Of course, e-MRTDs produced
with a post-quantum digital signature algorithm such as those used in our ex-
periments would not be compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 Part 12 [26] which
defines the algorithms to be used. Moreover, ICAO defines the minimum chip
size as 32 Kbytes [24]. Based on our results, none of the post-quantum certificate
would fit in a chip which provides this memory space. ICAO will have to update
their specifications for the post-quantum era in order to ensure the security of
e-MRTDs.
For this feasibility test of post-quantum PKI for e-MRTDs, we decided to
use OpenSSL for implementation flexibility and ease of use, but this tool is not
optimised or even designed for such a specific PKI. Possible future work includes
use of JMRTD16, an open source Java implementation for MRTD standards. This
14 See for example these contactless cryptocontrollers: https://www.infineon.com/cms/
en/product/security-smart-card-solutions/security-controllers/sle-78/.
15 These results are in line with the NIST Round 3 statement: https://nvlpubs.nist.
gov/nistpubs/ir/2020/NIST.IR.8309.pdf.
16 https://jmrtd.org/
tool uses The Legion of the Bouncy Castle, a cryptographic techniques library
which has included qTESLA since 201917.
The next generation of e-MRTDs will be based on post-quantum crypto-
graphic techniques, but no such documents have yet been issued, as far as we
are aware. This paper focuses only on one of the three steps verifying the au-
thenticity of an e-MRTD, but the other two steps also require cryptographic
asymmetric techniques that will need to be quantum-resistant.
Finally, governmental authorities managing a CSCA usually manage another
type of CA, known as the Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA). A
CVCA is used to issue Card Verifiable Certificates (CVCs) to control authorities
(such as the national police) so they can access, using the EAC protocol, fin-
gerprint and/or iris data (if present) held in the controlled area of an e-MRTD.
Further experiments will also be required to check possible post-quantum mi-
gration paths for this class of lightweight certificates.
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